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It is exactly ten years ago that the volume Byzantine Philosophy and its 
Ancient Sources was published (Ierodiakonou 2002). In the introduction to 
that volume my aim was to give a short guide to the basics of Byzantine 
philosophy, and at the same time a partial list of the unsettled questions 
concerning its dates, sources, and character. No definitive answers were 
given then; in fact it was argued that no definitive answers could be given, 
since more scholarly research needed to be done in this neglected area of the 
history of philosophy. A decade after, do we have answers to those ques-
tions? Is it time to reassess our somewhat dated, though still prevailing, 
standard views on the fundamental issues of Byzantine philosophy? 
During the last decade there has been increasing interest in Byzantine 
philosophy, which has resulted in the appearance of critical editions of 
Byzantine philosophical texts, systematic studies of specific topics in 
Byzantine philosophy, as well as general surveys of the discipline as a 
whole. It is also indicative that the recent volumes and websites of the 
Cambridge History of Late Antique Philosophy, the Cambridge History of 
Medieval Philosophy, the Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies, the 
Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, the Geschichte der Philosophie (Bd. 5, C. H. Beck), the Ency-
clopédie philosophique universelle, the Dictionnaire des philosophes 
antiques and others have included entries on Byzantine philosophy and on 
the more illustrious Byzantine thinkers. But does the implicit acknowledg-
ment that among the periods of the history of philosophy a place should also 
be reserved for the study of Byzantine thought imply that we are now in a 
position to draw a more accurate map of this formerly ignored field? 
It rather seems that, although some of the issues previously raised have 
been adequately scrutinized, many remain undecided or controversial. 
Moreover, it seems that new issues constantly open up and challenge our 
preconceived ideas about how we are to approach the philosophical writings 
of Byzantine times. In particular, the three main questions discussed in the 
introduction of the 2002 volume are still central and debated: ‘Is there phi-
losophical thinking in Byzantium? Isn’t it all theology?’; ‘When does 
Byzantine philosophy actually begin?’; ‘Who counts as a philosopher in 
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Byzantium?’. To these, further intriguing topics have been added in the 
meantime. For instance, a lot of attention has recently been given in work-
shops and conferences to the cultural exchanges between the civilizations of 
the Middle Ages, and this has of course brought into focus the interplay of 
Western medieval and Byzantine philosophy.1 
This introductory chapter, too, is not meant to supply conclusive answers 
to our questions concerning philosophical literature in Byzantium. At 
specific points I may sound less aporetic here than the last time around, but 
my aim is again to provoke further research rather than to settle the open 
issues once and for all. And I want to start by bringing up anew the crucial 
topic of the distinctive character of Byzantine philosophy. That is to say, I 
want to reconsider the expressed views on whether or not we can talk about 
an essence of Byzantine philosophy, an essence which clearly distinguishes 
it from Byzantine theology, as well as from ancient philosophy, and secures 
for it an autonomous status. Indeed, this topic has been at the centre of the 
latest controversy among the new generation of scholars working in this 
discipline. Furthermore, it best elucidates the general theme and title of the 
present volume. For Byzantine philosophical thinking, in my opinion, has 
many faces in the sense that it encompasses, just as ancient philosophy does, 
many different philosophical doctrines and many different ways of philoso-
phical life. As to whether this polyprismatic character of Byzantine philoso-
phy is as interesting or as thought-provoking as that of ancient philosophy, 
or for that matter of any other period in the history of philosophy, my con-
tention is that it remains to be judged on the basis of sustained and system-
atic scholarly research. 
 
Autonomy and Essence 
It is perfectly reasonable that the scholars who were the first to establish 
Byzantine philosophy as an academic discipline also raised the issue of the 
particular characteristics that distinguish this period in the history of phi-
losophy from what proceeds and what comes after it. The chief characteris-
tic that was singled out, effectively demarcating Byzantine from ancient 
philosophy, was none other than the religious affiliation of the authors 
                                                
1 I could mention, for example, the following conferences and workshops: ‘Greeks, Latins 
and Intellectual History 1204–1500’ (University of Cyprus, May 2008; cf. Hinterberger & 
Schabel 2011); ‘Renaissance Encounters: Greek East and Latin West’ (Princeton Univer-
sity, November 2009), ‘Knotenpunkt Byzanz’ (37. Kölner Mediaevistentagung, September 
2010; cf. Speer & Steinkrüger 2012) ‘Convivencia in Byzantium? Cultural Exchanges in a 
Multi-Ethnic and Multi-Lingual Society’ (Trinity College Dublin, October 2010). 
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whose texts were to form the philosophical canon of Byzantine times; and 
there is little doubt that, perhaps with the exception of George Gemistos 
Plethon, the Byzantine authors of philosophical texts all confessed them-
selves to be Christians. Therefore, Byzantine philosophy was conceived and 
presented as the Christian philosophy of the medieval East (Tatakis 1949). 
However, concerns were soon raised with respect to the extent to which this 
Christian character permeates Byzantine philosophical thought in such a 
dominant manner that philosophy becomes indistinguishable from theology 
in the period. So, right from the start of Byzantine philosophy as an aca-
demic discipline, there was an attempt to clarify its relationship to theology. 
The way this issue was formulated was by reference to the theoretical and 
practical autonomy of Byzantine philosophy (Benakis 1991). 
The subordination of philosophy to theology, implied by the conception 
of philosophy as the servant or handmaiden of theology (philosophia ancilla 
theologiae), originating from the theological tradition of Alexandria 
(Origen, Clement), was influential in the medieval West, but never the pre-
vailing view among the Byzantines. Theology in Byzantium did not have 
the systematic character that we encounter in the Western theological tradi-
tion and did not to any comparable extent use rational argumentation to 
support its claims. The theology of the Eastern Orthodox Church was very 
much based on revelation, and few arguments were accepted other than 
those drawn from the authority of Christian dogma (Podskalsky 1977). 
Hence, the theoretical boundary between philosophy and theology is easy to 
defend in the Byzantine context; philosophy did not serve theology’s aims, 
and even if it had similar aims to theology it used a different and independ-
ent method to achieve them, namely rational argumentation. As to the prac-
tical autonomy of Byzantine philosophy, it was safely secured by the fact 
that, at least for the most part and to the best of our knowledge, Byzantine 
philosophical education took place at institutions which did not fall under 
the auspices of the Orthodox Church. Hence, Byzantine philosophy was 
proclaimed to be ‘an authentic philosophical tradition’, influenced by but 
still distinct from both ancient philosophy and contemporary theology 
(Benakis 1998: 162; Kapriev 2006: 6). 
However, the very idea of autonomy was criticized as misleading and of 
no use; for it is indeed too difficult to find in Byzantium, or for that matter 
in the Middle Ages in general, authentic philosophical thought without the 
direct or indirect interference of faith and revelation. So, if we search for 
unrestricted autonomy, we may be asking too much from Byzantine phi-
losophy, and from Byzantine civilization in general. Of course, as long as 
Byzantine scholars commented on ancient philosophical texts, the purpose 
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of their enterprise was clearly distinct from that of Byzantine theology. But 
philosophical discourse in Byzantium also aimed at finding demonstrative 
reasons for things that the Byzantines were already certain about on non-
philosophical grounds, namely on the basis of their Christian beliefs. 
Moreover, philosophy was not supposed to inquire into the ultimate truth, 
and this prima facie restrained its freedom; for if human reason has its lim-
its, philosophy has to work within these limits. So, it may have been the 
case that Byzantine philosophy developed its own aims and methods, but 
nevertheless its conclusions had to be in agreement with theology and was 
compelled to remain silent in front of what is beyond comprehension. It has 
been persuasively argued, therefore, that it is only a weak sense of auton-
omy that we can apply in the case of the philosophical discourse of 
Byzantine times (Zografidis, unpublished).  
Having said that, I think there is also a stronger sense of autonomy that 
can be detected in the works of certain Byzantine thinkers, namely John 
Italos and George Gemistos Plethon. For philosophy in Byzantium seems to 
have regained with Italos its autonomy as a purely rational endeavour and 
one that even sought clear answers to questions concerning human destiny 
and the higher mysteries of Christianity. It is telling, I believe, that in doing 
philosophy Italos decided to talk about topics which nowadays, but also at 
the time, would be considered as belonging to theology as understood and 
taught by the Christian Fathers. In this Italos obviously followed the ancient 
conception of philosophy, according to which theology is part of philoso-
phy, since it is supposed to culminate in the attempt to understand the first 
principles of everything. And it was, most probably, this supposed arro-
gance on the part of philosophers who reversed the order of priority between 
philosophy and theology that the Orthodox Church refused to accept, when 
it decided to condemn and anathematize Italos’ doctrines (Ierodiakonou 
2007). In the case of Plethon, on the other hand, irrespective of whether it is 
historically accurate to regard him as a pagan or not, it was the exaltation of 
reason, his ‘cult of reason’, that led him to his secular utopianism and 
justified his claim that philosophy could guide man to happiness. This is 
perhaps the strongest pro-rationalist claim ever expressed during Byzantine 
times, but it is interesting that it was made right at the end of the Byzantine 
period (Zografidis 2008; Siniossoglou 2011a). 
Whether autonomous in an absolute or in a restricted sense, Byzantine 
thought still needs to prove what it offers the history of philosophy that is 
new. And the younger generation of scholars working in this area have tried 
to meet this challenge by reopening the discussion about the distinctive 
character of Byzantine philosophy, now phrased in terms of the ‘true face’ 
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(Cacouros 1998: 1364) or, more often, the ‘essence’ of Byzantine philoso-
phy. That is to say, the issue that has recently been at the centre of scholarly 
debate is whether we can actually talk of a single essence of Byzantine phi-
losophy or whether it is preferable to talk of many different Byzantine phi-
losophies. After all, the Byzantines themselves had half a dozen definitions 
of philosophy which they inherited from the Neoplatonic tradition. Philoso-
phy is defined throughout the Byzantine philosophical literature as: (i) 
knowledge of being as such; (ii) assimilation to God as far as humanly pos-
sible; (iii) knowledge of divine and human things; (iv) preparation for death; 
(v) art of the arts and science of the sciences; and (vi) love of wisdom. Fur-
thermore, the term ‘philosophy’ seems to have acquired two very different 
senses in Byzantine usage (Dölger 1953; Hunger 1978, vol. 1: 4–10): it re-
ferred to the engagement with the philosophical questions of antiquity, an 
engagement which resulted in the production of commentaries, paraphrases 
and synopses, but also to Christian doctrines that were believed to offer the 
true answers to many of those questions, as well as to the practice of the 
Christian life, i.e. to ascetic monasticism. As Anthony Kaldellis argues in 
this volume, these different senses of the term ‘philosophy’ sometimes rein-
forced each other, as when ancient philosophy was used to support Christian 
faith, but at other times they came into conflict and then ancient philosophy 
was perceived as a threat to the integrity of Christian faith. In fact, Christian 
authors often opposed their own ‘true’ philosophy to the pagan or ‘external’ 
one, so that a philosopher in this sense was simply a monk. 
Taking into consideration the different definitions and senses of 
Byzantine philosophy, Michele Trizio (2007) wrote an article in which he 
aptly expresses a widespread concern among contemporary scholars work-
ing in this field, claiming that the common tendency to attribute a modern 
conception of philosophy that hardly fits Byzantine intellectual history re-
sults in Byzantine philosophy becoming a category so narrow that it in-
cludes a very small number of thinkers and texts, while leaving 
uncategorized the vast majority of Byzantine intellectual endeavours. He 
thus argues that we should not take for granted that Byzantine philosophy 
can be defined in terms of an invariable, constant and unchangeable essence; 
for neither the set of Neoplatonic definitions as a whole, nor any one of 
them taken singly, can be univocally used for the definition of Byzantine 
philosophy. The more we study the texts of the Byzantine philosophical tra-
dition broadly construed, the more we realize how discontinuous and multi-
form this tradition is, and we detect a variety of meanings and functions 
attached to the term ‘philosophy’. Trizio’s suggestion is that we should not 
try to provide at all costs an image of Byzantine philosophy as a whole, but 
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we should attempt to figure out the different meanings and manifestations of 
the term ‘philosophy’ in Byzantium, i.e. the different Byzantine philoso-
phies and social practices that cohabit and sometimes even clash in the same 
context. 
Trizio’s position has already come in for criticism. In a recent article 
Niketas Siniossoglou (2011b) fiercely criticizes the anti-essentialist ap-
proach that refuses to define Byzantine philosophy; he considers it as a 
relativistic move that tends to hide the dependence of Byzantine thought on 
what he calls ‘the Christian hegemony of discourse’, i.e. the manipulation of 
Byzantine intellectuals on the part of the Church. Siniossoglou argues that, 
at the time of its establishment as an academic discipline, the history of 
Byzantine philosophy was intended to have as its core the thought of the 
Christian fathers; what the scholarly world has since anachronistically come 
to understand and present as philosophical thought in Byzantium cannot un-
conditionally qualify as the Byzantine engagement with philosophical dis-
course. This scholarly attitude, according to Siniossoglou, inadvertently 
suppresses the rise of the hegemonical role of the Church in the intellectual 
life of Byzantium, which instituted a hermeneutical monopoly in direct 
contravention to the qualifications of genuine philosophical discourse. 
Rather than being subservient to the Christian theological establishment, 
philosophical discourse in Byzantium reverted to calculated dissimulation 
that occasionally acquired an anti-authoritarian character; in other words, 
rather than Byzantine, philosophy in Byzantium was profoundly anti-
Byzantine. 
Siniossoglou’s proposal, too, has not been left unchallenged. Pantelis 
Golitsis (2011) has published a reply to Siniossoglou’s article in which he 
gives the following three arguments that seriously question the almighty 
presence of the Christian hegemony of discourse and the anti-Byzantine 
character of philosophy in Byzantium: (i) There is enough evidence to prove 
that the Eastern Orthodox Church did not defend, right from the start, a 
fully-fledged authoritative dogma, but developed it gradually over a long 
period of time. In fact, as late as the period of the Hesychasts, there were 
fervent debates over Christian dogma among members of the Christian es-
tablishment. (ii) There is no way of ignoring the fact that many Byzantine 
philosophers were actually part of the Christian establishment. For instance, 
Eustratios, who advocated the use of syllogisms in proving the two natures 
of Christ, was metropolitan of Nicaea. (iii) Even those Byzantine thinkers 
whom Siniossoglou portrays as dissidents opposed to the Church were often 
involved in articulating central theological doctrines, as is exemplified by 
Psellos’ theological writings. Thus, Golitsis backs up Trizio’s position that 
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it is not possible to give a definition of Byzantine philosophy. He suggests 
that, instead of reducing Byzantine philosophy to a single concept or 
tradition, we should pay attention both to the discontinuities as well as to the 
small continuities that can be found in Byzantine philosophical activity; in 
this way, we can examine it within its changing historical context and 
according to its twofold nature both as a Christian ascetic way of life and as 
part of the Hellenic paideia. 
I agree with Golitsis that Siniossoglou’s analysis is problematic when he 
ascribes to philosophy in Byzantium an anti-Byzantine character. There is 
no incontrovertible evidence that philosophers in Byzantium dissimulated 
adherence to paganism; on the contrary, most of them were well integrated 
and worked comfortably in the Christian milieu of the Byzantine state. In-
deed, they were clearly influenced by this background and often engaged 
themselves in contemporary discussions of a theological rather than phi-
losophical nature. At the same time, they were also influenced by the phi-
losophical traditions of antiquity, inquiring into the same topics that ancient 
philosophers had been interested in and making use of the same syllogistic 
methods that had been advanced by the ancients. In fact, it is this inextrica-
ble continuity with ancient philosophy that, I think, chiefly justifies treating 
the Byzantine philosophical discourse as philosophical. For it is reasonable 
to claim that the Byzantines did philosophy as long as they were investigat-
ing the logical, ethical and physical questions that had puzzled ancient phi-
losophers, some of which are still preoccupying contemporary philosophers. 
Of course, it is important to recognize, too, that philosophical thinking in 
Byzantium was not merely a continuation of ancient philosophy, as Klaus 
Oehler (1969) stated. Reading Byzantine philosophy in this light would de-
prive us of the opportunity to detect the particularity of philosophical 
thought in Byzantium (Kapriev 2006: 5–6; Ivanovic 2010: 371–72). 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that what the Byzantines called ‘phi-
losophy’ and what we nowadays call ‘philosophy’ are sometimes strikingly 
different. After all, part of the interest of Byzantine philosophy is precisely 
the various conceptions found in Byzantine texts of what philosophy itself 
should be, conceptions which may sometimes seem to conflict with each 
other but still constitute Byzantine philosophy as a whole (Bradshaw 2005). 
Does this mean, though, that we should regard as Byzantine philosophy 
whatever the Byzantines called ‘philosophy’? Let me briefly explain what I 
have in mind. 
The question as to whether we should follow our own perspective and 
consider as Byzantine philosophy what we nowadays understand as phi-
losophy rather than what the Byzantines, or for that matter the Christian 
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Fathers, did becomes particularly intricate in the case of philosophy being 
conceived of as the ascetic way of life. Would a Byzantine monk, for in-
stance, be regarded as a philosopher just on the grounds that he led an as-
cetic life? It is worth noting that this issue does not emerge only in 
connection with Byzantine times. Jonathan Barnes (2002a) discussed the 
evidence from inscriptions and texts which suggest that in late antiquity 
many men, and interestingly many women, too, were called ‘philosophers’, 
though their contribution to the philosophical discourse of their time is ob-
scure.2 Should we include them in our canon of ancient philosophers just 
because their contemporaries called them ‘philosophers’? Also, some of the 
people called ‘philosophers’ seem to have been involved in practices 
completely foreign to what we would now consider as philosophical. Should 
we think of such practices as philosophical, just because they were done by 
people who were at the time called ‘philosophers’? 
Barnes discusses the example of Evagrius, the leader of a group of 
Christians in Beirut at the end of the fifth century, to whom our sources 
refer as a philosopher who led a paradigmatically ascetic life. But does this 
imply that it was by virtue of his asceticism that Evagrius was called ‘phi-
losopher’? Though tied to philosophy, asceticism may have been simply a 
sign or concomitant of the feature by virtue of which Evagrius was called 
‘philosopher’. For the relation between philosophy and asceticism, to use 
Barnes’ own analogy, is like the relation between health and exercise; just 
as ‘healthy’ does not mean ‘taking exercise’, so ‘philosopher’ does not 
mean ‘recluse’. Evagrius as well as all those people who were called ‘phi-
losophers’ at the time were considered as such because they interested them-
selves in and studied the sort of things which had been discussed by Plato, 
Aristotle, Epicurus and Chrysippus; moreover, because sometimes they may 
have had their own views and developed theories about certain traditionally 
philosophical subjects, like for instance the immortality of the soul or causal 
determinism. It would not, therefore, be difficult to recognize them, Barnes 
argues, by the congruence between their intellectual interests and those of 
the Great Masters.3 Similarly, as Pantelis Golitsis shows in his contribution 
in this volume, George Pachymeres’ praise of Nikephoros Blemmydes as a 
philosopher was not on the basis of his ascetic life as a monk. On the con-
trary, Pachymeres conceived of Blemmydes’ philosophical life as a philoso-
                                                
2 The classic study for the use of the relevant Greek terms is by A.-M. Malingrey (1961), 
whom Barnes criticizes in his article for her methods and inferences. 
3 I think that Siniossoglou (2011), who also refers to this article, misinterprets Barnes’ posi-
tion, when he attributes to him the view that, due to the lack of a clear criterion, everyone in 
late antiquity could have been characterized as a ‘philosopher’. 
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phically trained intellectual life that induced suspension of judgment on 
human affairs, and thus liberation from mundane human concerns. For it is 
this sort of life, according to Pachymeres, which may constitute the founda-
tion to real devoutness to God, a devoutness that has to be reflective and can 
hardly be combined with the anti-intellectualist faith of monastic life. 
It seems, therefore, that the term ‘philosophy’ does not acquire in 
Byzantium an altogether different sense from that which we find in antiq-
uity, though there are cases in which Byzantine thinkers may have been 
called ‘philosophers’ for reasons that cannot be considered as philosophical 
either from the perspective of ancient philosophers or from our own modern 
perspective. But this does not mean that Byzantine philosophy is philosophy 
in a different sense than ancient philosophy is, or for that matter than any 
other period of philosophy, when it comes to its objects of philosophical 
study and ways of pursuing them. At the same time, this does not mean that 
we should not be open to detecting aspects of the Byzantine philosophical 
discourse which are peculiar to this historical period, and to which we must 
be particularly sensitive if we want to pinpoint the distinctive characteristics 
of Byzantine philosophy. For as part of Byzantine civilization, which was 
undeniably influenced in most of its manifestations by Christianity, 
Byzantine philosophy developed certain concepts and relied on certain 
premises that were molded by the religious affiliation of Byzantine philoso-
phers; and it is exactly such concepts and premises that may not be found in, 
or may be peripheral to, other periods of philosophy; moreover, it was such 
concepts and premises that were to promote a different conception of phi-
losophical life in Byzantium. Needless to say, this applies in all periods of 
philosophy. Philosophy is a historical phenomenon, both in the sense that 
one does philosophy, or one is a philosopher, when one does what previous 
philosophers have done (i.e. one discusses the same issues and makes use of 
the same methods), but also in the sense that whatever a philosopher does 
may be crucially determined by the specific historical context in which she 
or he is immersed.  
Philosophy cannot be said to have a well-defined single essence, and 
Byzantine philosophy cannot be said to share with other periods of philoso-
phy such an unchangeable essence. We recognize someone as being a phi-
losopher by comparing what he or she does with what past philosophers 
were doing; so, we recognize Byzantine philosophers as philosophers be-
cause they are typically concerned with questions inherited from the pre-
ceding philosophical tradition, namely ancient philosophy. As to those 
features which distinguish Byzantine philosophy from what past philoso-
phers were engaged in, they should be closely studied but should not mis-
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lead us into talking of Byzantine philosophies. For although it may be the 
case that many different doctrines and approaches were advanced by 
Byzantine philosophers, doctrines and approaches that were sometimes even 
in conflict with each other, we can still regard them as part of Byzantine 
philosophy as a whole. Besides, we do not talk of ancient or modern ‘phi-
losophies’, though we are well acquainted with the variety of philosophical 
theories and attitudes presented by ancient and modern thinkers. Due to the 
fact, I think, that research in Byzantine philosophy has not been developed 
as much as in other fields, we tend to focus on certain standard texts and 
philosophical positions which we identify as the core of Byzantine philoso-
phy, so that any divergences from these seem to create the need to talk of 
different philosophies. We should keep in mind, however, that although the 
Epicureans, for instance, were hardly interested in logic, they are still cate-
gorized as what we standardly think of as Hellenistic philosophy. Hence, I 
do not agree that Byzantine philosophy has a true face, nor that there are 
many Byzantine philosophies; it is preferable, in my view, simply to talk of 
the many faces of Byzantine philosophy. 
But before I bring to a close the topic of the autonomy and essence of 
Byzantine philosophy, let me add something concerning the argumentative 
techniques of Byzantine philosophers, for this has been another area that has 
caused considerable concern to those scholars who refuse to subordinate 
Byzantine philosophy to the theological thinking of the time. To put it 
briefly, the issue is the following: if Byzantine philosophy depends on di-
vine revelation in order to reach its conclusions, can it be considered as 
philosophy? It is true that serious criticisms were voiced against the use of 
rational argumentation in different periods of Byzantine history; logic was 
thought of as suitable for mediocre minds, but not as adequate for reaching 
the ultimate truth. There is also no doubt that Byzantine philosophers often 
used arguments that were not completely open-ended; rather, they were 
clearly designed to protect and support Christian dogma against heretical 
views. Finally, it cannot be denied that in their philosophical endeavours the 
Byzantines did not devote much space to testing or doubting the doctrines 
defended by the Eastern Orthodox Church. 
Nevertheless, important though the notions of revealed truth and illumi-
nation may have been, the majority of Byzantine philosophers made ample 
use of Aristotelian syllogistic even in explaining Christian dogmas and in 
defending them against objections. Also, it is worth noting that most of the 
arguments the Byzantines used in their philosophical reasoning were usually 
based on premises that were argued for and not God-given (Ierodiakonou 
2007). And even if in certain cases Byzantine thinkers were influenced by 
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their religious predilections in formulating their arguments, how much dif-
ferent in this respect is Byzantine philosophy from Western medieval, 
Jewish or Arabic philosophy? After all, in all periods of philosophy there is 
good and bad philosophy, and reaching conclusions that are not well-
grounded is definitely one of the characteristics of bad philosophy. In his 
paper in this volume Börje Bydén discusses the issue of how it was possible 
for Byzantine philosophers to pursue cosmology as a demonstrative science 
and to insist at the same time on the infallible truth of the Christian revela-
tion. John Philoponus, whom many Byzantines closely followed in this as in 
other cases, seems to have opted for a ‘Harmony View’, according to which 
there can be no contradiction between natural philosophy, as correctly prac-
tised, and the Christian revelation, as correctly interpreted. So, in order to 
establish that creationism is true, Philoponus undertook to show, in his trea-
tises Contra Proclum and Contra Aristotelem, that the premises of ancient 
philosophers either do not support their conclusions or else are false. No 
doubt the main aspiration of his programme was to defend the Christian 
cause, but Philoponus tried to fulfil it by means of rational argumentation, 
and in particular by substituting the false premises with true ones and 
drawing the inferences correctly. 
 
Tradition and Innovation 
Having argued that the interaction between Byzantine and ancient philoso-
phy is at the heart of the problem concerning the philosophical status of the 
works of Byzantine thinkers, it is time to have a closer look at two aspects 
of this interaction. The first concerns the dates of these two periods in the 
history of philosophy, and the second the general character of the influence 
of ancient on Byzantine philosophy. 
The problem of deciding what characterizes Byzantine philosophy and 
the recognition of its close connections with ancient philosophy are also 
reflected in the difficulty to determine when exactly ancient philosophy ends 
and Byzantine philosophy starts. In other words, we are still faced with the 
question raised at the introduction of the 2002 volume: ‘When does 
Byzantine philosophy actually begin?’ Of course, it is also difficult to as-
certain the end of Byzantine philosophy, since its impact cannot be said to 
have vanished immediately with the fall of Constantinople in 1453, but the 
issue of the beginning of Byzantine philosophy seems to be even more 
problematic. For there are significant objections to positing as the starting 
point either a suitable political event or an important incident in the intel-
lectual history of that period; that is to say, there are significant objections to 
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attributing to Byzantine philosophy an early start in the fourth century (the 
foundation of Constantinople), or in the sixth century (the closing of the 
Neoplatonist Academy by Justinian), or a later start in the eighth century 
(the appearance of John of Damascus’ Dialectica), or even in the ninth 
century (the flourishing of Byzantine ‘humanism’).  
Whatever one decides, however, there should be no doubt that the pre-
ferred date is nothing but conventional, just like most historical hallmarks. 
More importantly, there should be no doubt that it is extremely useful to 
study Byzantine philosophy in close association with the philosophical, 
theological and scientific thinking of the earlier centuries. For we are often 
reminded while studying the works of Byzantine scholars that Byzantine 
philosophy is a seamless continuation of ancient philosophy, and especially 
the philosophy of late antiquity. In this volume, for instance, Börje Bydén 
shows that, when it comes to the problem of the eternity of the world, most 
Byzantine cosmological writers borrowed both their rationalistic approach 
and the specific arguments in favour of creationism from John Philoponus. 
In fact, it is worth noting that it is particularly difficult to decide whether to 
classify Philoponus as belonging to late antiquity or Byzantium, and admit-
tedly this does not become less problematic by taking into consideration 
what the Byzantines themselves thought. For when George Gennadios 
Scholarios listed the Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s logic, he grouped 
Philoponus together with Leo Magentenos and Michael Psellos, rather than 
with the commentators of late antiquity, namely Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
Porphyry, Themistius and Simplicius, without indicating his criterion in a 
clear way (Ierodiakonou 2012). 
But wherever we place the break between ancient and Byzantine phi-
losophy, there is still a lot to be done in order to specify the extent to which 
Byzantine philosophers were influenced by their ancient precursors. The 
most controversial topic concerns the end to which, according to the 
Byzantines, the study of ancient philosophy was meant to contribute. 
Scholars mostly tend to see in Byzantium a more or less harmonious 
synthesis of ancient philosophy and the Christian background of Byzantine 
thinkers. For instance, Pantelis Golitsis claims in his paper that, in compos-
ing his Philosophia, Pachymeres aimed at challenging the misconception of 
ancient philosophy as being incompatible with the heart of Christian doc-
trine, by transforming Aristotle into a forerunner of the Christian truth. 
Anthony Kaldellis, on the other hand, focuses on the cultural dynamic of 
Christian authority and the opposition of certain Byzantine thinkers, whom 
he considers as dissidents, because they self-consciously, even if only cov-
ertly, came to certain philosophical positions that were incompatible with 
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Orthodoxy. Byzantine dissidents, according to Kaldellis, were not ‘pagans’ 
(at least not so long as that term requires cult or belief in the ancient gods), 
but their intellectual journeys were helped along by the study of ancient, 
non-Christian philosophy. 
To settle this and similar differences of scholarly opinion, it would be 
helpful to gather more information about the actual knowledge Byzantine 
thinkers had of ancient philosophical theories, as well as about the actual 
use they made of them. That is to say, it would be helpful to gather more 
information about who the ancient philosophers were whose works the 
Byzantines read, to what degree they were acquainted with the ancient phi-
losophical literature, and through which channels they came to be familiar 
with the ancient philosophical views. To start with, it would be of great use 
to future research to collect, in a systematic and critical manner, the 
Byzantine references to ancient philosophers, just like David Runia (1989) 
did in his investigation of how much the Greek Fathers knew and made use 
of Aristotle’s treatises. Besides, the collection of such evidence could also 
assist us in specifying preferences of Byzantine thinkers with regard to the 
various philosophical traditions of antiquity. For the Byzantines have often 
been thought of as generally adhering to Neoplatonism, but it becomes more 
and more clear that it is not that simple to categorize even individual authors 
as Platonists or as Aristotelians (Bydén, forthcoming). Indeed, Byzantine 
philosophers could be seen as advocates of the kind of eclecticism that is 
also found in late antique authors; that is to say, they do not seem to have 
been consistently loyal to one of the ancient philosophical schools, but 
rather preferred to combine doctrines developed by different ancient tradi-
tions.  
What is true, moreover, is that Byzantine philosophers do not seem to 
have aimed at originality, another feature which they share with authors of 
late antiquity, and in particular with the Aristotelian commentators. How-
ever, even in their role as commentators, the Byzantines, just like the an-
cient commentators, managed to express their own views, which were 
sometimes heavily influenced by their Christian perspective. It is really sur-
prising, as Michele Trizio points out in his paper in this volume, that Paul 
Moraux accused Eustratios of Nicaea of being a pedantic, repetitive and 
boring commentator at the same time as he condemned him for introducing 
in his commentaries his own views, as if such a practice was against the 
rules of how a commentator should work. Fortunately, Trizio adds, this 
negative evaluation of Eustratios’ philosophical comments is constantly 
losing ground among modern scholars. Besides, the fact that Eustratios’ 
commentaries were not poorly written seems to be corroborated by their 
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later fortune, in so far as they were not only read by many Byzantine 
authors, for instance Theodore Prodromos, George Pachymeres and 
Nikephoros Gregoras, but also translated into Latin and used extensively in 
the West. So, by George Gennadios Scholarios’ time the commentator’s 
task was both to unravel and explain the ancient text by offering interpreta-
tions of obscure passages, as well as to take the views of his predecessors 
seriously and comment upon them, often regarding the previous commen-
taries as a continuation of the Aristotelian work. For it seems that, in 
Gennadios’ view, the role of the commentator was to transform Aristotle’s 
thought for pedagogical purposes, but most importantly to expand on it. 
And it makes sense to suggest that such a development was closely con-
nected to the fact that Gennadios consulted, as he himself was proud to ad-
mit, both the established ancient and Byzantine commentary tradition as 
well as the tradition inaugurated by the Latin scholars (Ierodiakonou 2012). 
 
Authors and Texts 
The third of the main questions raised in the 2002 volume, ‘Who counts as a 
philosopher in Byzantium?’, opens up another area in which Byzantine 
philosophy can be said to exhibit many faces. For it is not only that in 
Byzantine thought we detect different philosophical doctrines and ways of 
philosophical life, and it is not simply that Byzantine philosophers were 
influenced by different philosophical traditions to different degrees; the 
figure of the Byzantine philosopher can also be said to be complex. For 
most Byzantine philosophers were not professional philosophers in the way 
their counterparts were in the medieval Western universities. Byzantine 
philosophers may have been teachers of philosophy, but they were also high 
officials, clerics, monks, even patriarchs. 
Unfortunately, there has not been very much discussion about the dis-
tinctive characteristics of the Byzantine philosopher, i.e. whether there is 
something peculiar and special about philosophers in Byzantium that distin-
guishes them from philosophers of other periods and cultures. To investi-
gate this subject adequately one would need to examine carefully the lives 
and deeds of philosophers at different junctures in Byzantine history. No 
doubt this is a vast and far-reaching inquiry that would be difficult to carry 
out in an exhaustive way, even if one decides to focus only on the most re-
nowned and distinguished of Byzantine thinkers; but, I think, it would be 
worth pursuing. More difficult, though, is to determine whom one should 
include in the list of Byzantine thinkers who can rightfully be called ‘phi-
losophers’. For it seems important not to rely exclusively on our own mod-
Byzantine Philosophy Revisited    15 
 
ern preconceptions of what it takes to be a philosopher, but also to take into 
account how Byzantine thinkers were portrayed both by their contemporar-
ies and by the immediately following generations. Moreover, it is equally 
important to examine how Byzantine thinkers themselves viewed and pre-
sented their role as philosophers. Hence, one needs to analyse systematically 
the autobiographical texts as well as all relevant biographical material con-
cerning those who were considered in Byzantium as philosophers in order to 
reach a better understanding of the figure of the philosopher at that particu-
lar period in the history of philosophy. In this volume, for instance, Dominic 
O’Meara throws light on the two facets of Michael Psellos’ personality as it 
emerges in his historical and his philosophical writings; namely, the politi-
cal thinker and actor of the Chronographia on the one hand, and the teacher 
of the philosophical treatises and commentaries on the other. O’Meara 
shows that, by reading Psellos’ history in relation to comparable ideas in his 
philosophical works, we can reach a better understanding of the political 
thought in the Chronographia, and of its relation to the political philosophy 
of antiquity.  
Indeed, Psellos serves as a good example of a Byzantine thinker who not 
only succeeded in different careers, but also composed works belonging to 
different disciplines and genres: philosophical treatises and commentaries, 
theological, legal, geographical, historical and medical works, as well as 
poems, works on music and many letters and speeches. Thus, in order to 
give a comprehensive account of the intellectual contribution of Byzantine 
philosophers, it is crucial to take into consideration what they had to say 
about philosophy when writing in different disciplines employing different 
genres of writing. In Psellos’ case, in particular, it is not only that his writ-
ings exhibit a sophisticated rhetorical style for which he became famous, we 
also find in them the theoretical justification of the close combination of 
philosophy with rhetoric as the ideal philosopher’s discursive practice. For 
as Stratis Papaioannou argues in this volume, Psellos advocated, for the first 
time in the history of the philosophico-rhetorical debate, the indissoluble 
mixture of philosophy and rhetoric ‘as if in a single mixing bowl’. After all, 
it is this mixture which he propagated consistently in his philosophical 
teaching and letters, and for which he praised intellectual figures of the past 
and the present. 
Finally, Byzantine philosophers explored different areas of philosophy; 
they seem to have been interested not only in logic and metaphysics, but 
also in cosmology, natural philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy. 
George Arabatzis, for instance, presents to us, in this volume, Michael of 
Ephesus’ comments on the biological works of Aristotle, for which there is 
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no ancient commentary. In this way, Michael’s commentaries, just like 
other Byzantine commentaries and paraphrases, become an invaluable 
source for ancient views on this hitherto underexplored but intriguing area 
of natural philosophy. Also, Dimiter Angelov’s paper introduces us to yet 
another area of philosophy that seems to have captured the attention of 
Byzantine thinkers, namely political philosophy. Angelov analyses the no-
tion of the royal science, i.e. the knowledge possessed by a philosopher-
king, as it is discussed by Nikephoros Blemmydes and Theodore II 
Laskaris. In the preface to his Epitome logica, Blemmydes claimed that 
kingship is similar to philosophy, since they both preside over their 
respective spheres; kingship is the highest political dignity, while philoso-
phy is the art of arts and science of sciences. When kingship and philosophy 
converge, the ruling power reaches perfection and secures a good life for the 
ruled. Blemmydes’ politically powerful student, Theodore II Laskaris, de-
veloped further this notion of royal science, explaining at length the impor-
tance of philosophy in the education of an imperial prince. 
 
Reception and Historiographical Approaches 
Byzantine philosophers defended different doctrines and attitudes to phi-
losophical life, showed different degrees of preference to different ancient 
philosophical schools, played different roles in the political and intellectual 
world of Byzantium, produced writings of different genres in different dis-
ciplines and in the different areas of philosophy. Interestingly enough, this 
multifaceted Byzantine philosophical output has been received in different 
ways at different periods by scholars working in different fields, such as 
philosophy, theology, classics, history, history of ideas. Michele Trizio 
(2007) assumed the task to chart the historiographical approaches to 
Byzantine philosophy, and to explain the recent increase of interest in its 
study, by associating it to the increase of interest in the study of the medie-
val Latin, Arabic and Jewish philosophical traditions. I think he must be 
right, although another factor should also be taken into consideration for the 
explanation of the phenomenon; namely, the increase of interest in the study 
of another until recently neglected area, namely the Aristotelian commen-
taries. 
The conclusion of Trizio’s survey of the historiography of Byzantine 
philosophy was that there is an urgent need to replace Basil Tatakis’ hand-
book (1949) with a new, more comprehensive history of Byzantine thought. 
He disagreed about this with Linos Benakis, who expressed the opinion that 
we are not yet ready to compose such a history (2002: 285), but approved 
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Georgi Kapriev’s statement that today we are not only ready but obliged to 
do so (2006: 10). Personally, I also agree that several of the interpretations 
suggested by Tatakis are obsolete; that since the publication of Tatakis’ 
book, the number of scholars in the field of Byzantine philosophy has 
significantly increased, and so has the quantity and quality of editions and 
bibliographical contributions; that a handbook is particularly needed for in-
troducing to non-experts as well as prospective scholars the basics of 
Byzantine philosophical thought. But there are still, I think, important gaps 
in our knowledge of Byzantine philosophy. Despite the work of the last ten 
years, there are simply too many Byzantine texts that remain unedited, and 
it is not even clear which of them should be regarded as philosophical. Con-
sequently, I have repeatedly expressed the view that it may be too early to 
produce an introduction to Byzantine philosophy. Nevertheless, I also rec-
ognize that there are good enough reasons not to dismiss this idea.4 After 
all, no work, and especially not an introduction, is expected to be the last 
word; it may rather give us a chance to realize what has been accomplished 
and what more needs to be done in this field. I still believe, though, that 
such general works should go hand in hand with specific studies that scruti-
nize the Byzantine philosophical texts themselves; and it is such scholarly 
endeavours as well as collaborative projects that I consider to be more 
promising in delivering significant results at this relatively early stage of 
research. 
 
This volume constitutes the outcome of such scholarly endeavours and 
collaborative projects. It should be noted, however, that in its initial con-
ception it had a different character from the present. It was meant to come 
out as the proceedings of a panel in the 21st International Conference of 
Byzantine Studies (London, August 2006) with the general title ‘The auton-
omy of Byzantine philosophy’. The aim was to study the place philosophy 
occupied in Byzantine society and culture; in particular, the aim was to deal 
with the question of whether there is such a thing as philosophy in 
Byzantium clearly demarcated from theology and resistant to the pressures 
of religious orthodoxy and political authority. The speakers were Dimiter 
Angelov, Börje Bydén, George Zografidis and myself, and the areas of phi-
losophy covered were logic, metaphysics, cosmology and political philoso-
phy. At the end of the conference we decided to publish a volume on this 
central topic, which would include relevant contributions from more col-
                                                
4 For instance, I welcome the decision of Acumen Publishing to entrust George Zografidis 
with the writing of an introduction to Byzantine philosophy. 
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leagues and thus cover, in a comprehensive and systematic way, other areas 
of Byzantine philosophy. That project was never realized; instead, this vol-
ume now appears, containing some of the heavily revised presentations of 
the 2006 London conference together with other papers that were presented 
and discussed at a conference at the Norwegian Institute of Athens in 
December 2008. 
Like the 2002 volume, this volume is not an introduction to Byzantine 
philosophy. It is a collection of articles on specific texts and themes of 
Byzantine philosophy and does not purport to deal with any of them in an 
exhaustive way. Moreover, it is not a collection of articles intended for the 
general public; rather, it is meant to whet the appetite of historians of phi-
losophy, Byzantinists, classicists, historians of ideas and philosophers for a 
largely unexplored period in the history of philosophy. But since this vol-
ume shares some features with the 2002 volume, it makes sense to wonder 
whether it might be vulnerable to the same criticisms that reviewers have 
raised in the meantime. Is it the case, for instance, that it ‘offers very little 
for any non-specialist seduced by the title into thinking this to be a system-
atic and general treatment of the transmission and development of ancient 
Greek philosophy in the Byzantine Middle Ages’ (Searby 2002)? Or, does it 
fail ‘to some extent in its intention to introduce Byzantine philosophy to a 
wider audience’ (Sellars 2004, 344)? Such remarks would have been per-
fectly justifiable, I think, if it were not the case that in the introduction of the 
previous volume, as here, an attempt was made to outline clearly the 
limitations regarding the scope and purpose of these volumes. For our in-
tention was not and is not to present either of these volumes as handbooks 
of Byzantine philosophy or general treatments of the influence of ancient 
thought on Byzantine philosophy; and as for their titles, though admittedly 
vague in their generality, it is far-fetched to regard them as misleading in 
this direction, or for that matter seductive. 
A more challenging criticism of the 2002 volume referred to the fact that 
it rested on the assumption that Byzantine philosophy was understood as 
what could be connected to canonical ancient sources such as Plato and 
Aristotle (Bradshaw 2005); and the same can certainly be said about this 
volume, too. As I tried to explain at the beginning, I cannot but agree with 
the claim, which David Bradshaw elaborated in his book published in 2004, 
that Byzantine philosophy should be treated as much as a way of life as a 
form of understanding, and should therefore not be separated from its re-
vealed source. Nevertheless, just as in the case of the 2002 volume, we also 
prefer in this volume—and I write here also on behalf of my co-editor—to 
focus on those Byzantine texts and authors that most closely relate, con-
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sciously or otherwise, to the concerns of the ancient philosophical texts and 
authors; and the reason for this preference is, as we have previously stated, 
not that ‘we believe that an account in which the religious dimension is 
largely ignored is sufficient to grasp Byzantine intellectual history in its or-
ganic entirety, but because we think that a clearer conception of this part of 
Byzantine intellectual history is both desirable in itself and necessary for the 
understanding of the whole’ (Ierodiakonou & Bydén 2008). 
This volume, therefore, intends to follow the tradition of the previous one 
in presenting some more ‘trial sections in a ground almost unknown to his-
torians of philosophy’ (Zografidis 2003: 414); some more useful ‘prelimi-
nary explorations of a largely unmapped terrain’ (Bradshaw 2005: 236); 
some more scholarly studies which focus on details in anticipation that this 
may be ‘the likeliest way of reaching the still-distant goal of a broad, deep 
understanding of Byzantine philosophy’ (Livanos 2003: 260). For this vol-
ume principally aims at persuading its readership that Byzantine philosophy 
is worth investigating; and I am not of the opinion that there is only one way 
in which a period in the history of philosophy may be worth investigating. I 
perfectly understand, of course, that philosophers could insist that the de-
gree of originality characterizing the ideas introduced in a period of phi-
losophy should be an important criterion. In this respect, the previous 
volume received some damning criticisms; for instance, it was argued that 
for the most part Byzantine philosophers seem to have been not only uno-
riginal but ‘uninterestingly unoriginal’ (Hankinson 2003), or ‘not particu-
larly engaging philosophically’ (Bradshaw 2005: 236).  
Could the same criticism be raised against this volume, too? It remains to 
be seen. For the time being, I want to underline the fact that, even if it is 
once again proved that Byzantine philosophers did not present original phi-
losophical theories, or developed those of their predecessors in philosophi-
cally exciting ways, this should not be regarded as a good enough reason for 
its sweeping condemnation. For as Jonathan Barnes wrote in the 2002 vol-
ume, originality or lack thereof should not determine whether one should 
study Byzantine philosophy or not: ‘Originality is the rarest of philosophical 
commodities. It is also an over-rated virtue: a thinker who strives to under-
stand, to conserve, and to transmit the philosophy of the past is engaged in 
no humdrum or unmeritorious occupation’ (Barnes 2002b, 98). Indeed, it is 
important, I think, to realize the extent to which Byzantine thinkers help us 
in our attempt to understand better ancient philosophical texts; they provide 
us with information about ancient doctrines that have since been lost; they 
play a significant role in the history of Platonism and Aristotelianism in the 
West and, thus, they form part of the background for later philosophical de-
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velopments. To appreciate Byzantine philosophy we simply need to make 
an effort to explore its multifaceted character. 
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